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Abstract
Statistical approaches to cyber-security involve building realistic probability mod-
els of computer network data. In a data pre-processing phase, separating automated
events from those caused by human activity should improve statistical model build-
ing and enhance anomaly detection capabilities. This article presents a changepoint
detection framework for identifying periodic subsequences of event times. The open-
ing event of each subsequence can be interpreted as a human action which then
generates an automated, periodic process. Difficulties arising from the presence of
duplicate and missing data are addressed. The methodology is demonstrated using
authentication data from the computer network of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
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1 Introduction
Recent statistical approaches to cyber-security defence [1, 2] utilize anomaly detection
techniques based upon statistical models of normal network behavior, analyzing devia-
tions in an attempt to identify malicious actors. Regarding the arrivals of communica-
tions between each pair of hosts in a computer network as a point process of event times
on R+, this article proposes a method to distinguish between automated network events
and those caused by human behavior.
Polling behavior at a constant periodicity is a common feature of automated signal
traffic. [3] presents a method to detect overall polling behavior in a sequence of event data
using Fourier analysis. The work presented here aims to detect more complex polling
behavior where the entire traffic sequence can be split up into periodic subsequences,
separated by more random durations of inactivity. In this scenario, the start of each
periodic subsequence is a user-driven event that initiates subsequent automated polling
events that beacon at a constant periodicity. Since the user-driven events are not labeled,
inferring their identities between the bulk of automated, periodic events can be viewed
as a changepoint detection problem.
When the method of [3] is applied to periodic subsequences of event data, detection
performance can be seen to deteriorate when the lengths of each periodic subsequence are
relatively short. This provides justification for devising bespoke procedures for detecting
periodic subsequences.
Treating automated and user-driven data separately should provide a more robust
framework for modeling network data, whereby bespoke models can be specified for each
type of behavior. Alternatively, as a data reduction tool, identifying only user-driven
events represents a significant thinning of the bulk of computer network data, poten-
tially improving anomaly detection capabilities. Examples of periodic subsequences in
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network data can occur in the constant refreshing of an open webpage, or when validating
log on credentials in authentication data [4].
This article focuses on two types of polling behavior which can be observed in com-
puter network data, each exhibiting a hypothetical periodicity P in different ways:
1. Fixed phase polling: Event times occur every P seconds plus a random zero-mean
error; any delay in one event time does not propagate into future event times.
2. Fixed duration polling: Event times occur P seconds after the preceding event, plus
a random zero-mean error.
In this article a full generative model is proposed for event times exhibiting both types of
polling. These models are robust to both missing and duplicate data.
Section 2 will describe the data used for analysis, taken from the Los Alamos National
Laboratory computer network. Section 3 will introduce the screening method used for
detecting periodicity in a sequence of event times, demonstrating effectiveness in the
presence of periodic subsequences. Section 4 will show how directional statistics can be
used to model the error terms of periodic events as angular displacements. Sections 5
and 6 will describe how changepoint detection methods can identify separate periodic
subsequences conditional on an underlying model. Section 7 will present results from
both a simulated data example which exhibits fixed phase polling, and the real computer
network data which exhibits fixed duration polling.
2 Computer Network Authentication
The data analyzed are authentication logs collected over 58 days from the Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) internal computer network [5, 4]. The authentication logs
record a source username and computer, a destination username and computer, and the
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time when the authentication event was initiated. Additionally, the type of authentica-
tion event is also recorded, such as “Network”, “Kerberos” or “Negotiate”. Authentication
events often exhibit periodic polling, separated by random durations of inactivity. This
can occur when a user initially authenticates their credentials on a computer, and the au-
thentication mechanism then periodically verifies the continued validity of those creden-
tials. Such information cannot be derived from the authentication event types collected
in the data.
The left panel of Figure 1 plots all event times for an example user, U514, authenti-
cating between two particular computers, C528 and C15607, over the 58-day period. It is
apparent that these data comprise several periodic subsequences of evenly-spaced event
times. Each subsequence starts during working hours, and so these initial events are po-
tentially user-driven. Note that within the periodic subsequences there can be duplicate
events or missing data, and so it is important that any proposed model is robust to these
data features. Duplicates can occur when multiple packets are sent, and missing data can
occur when there is packet loss either on the network or on the central authentication
server. A comprehensive explanation of the data is given in [4].
The right panel of Figure 1 shows a circular histogram of the times of day for all 4688
“Log On” events initiated by the same user, U514, connecting between any source and
destination computers. Time-of-day event data are most informatively plotted on a circle
whose circumference represents one day. In this way, event data falling just before and
just after midnight are displayed close together, rather than at opposite ends of a section
of the real line. The limited variation in the number of events within and outside the
working day further implies that there is substantial automated polling behavior.
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Figure 1: Log on event times over a 58-day period for an example user, U514, from the
LANL computer network. Left: Log on event times between two specific computers fre-
quented by the user, C528 and C15607. Right: The time of day distribution for all events
generated by the user.
3 Detecting Polling Behavior
A natural approach for detecting polling behavior, described in detail in [3], is to calculate
a discrete Fourier transform [6] of the event times of each point process in the network
in order to uncover any periodicities; a large peak in the resulting periodogram S(f )
indicates polling behavior at frequency f . In particular, a standard significance test for a
simple periodicity (see, for example [7]) uses the test statistic
g = max
f
S(f )∑
f ′ S(f ′)
, (1)
where the sum in the denominator and the maximization are both over the Fourier fre-
quencies. An approximate upper-tail p-value for g can be calculated under the null hy-
pothesis of no polling behavior.
[8] presents a Bayesian model for network authentication behavior which was applied
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to the data described in Section 2 with some success. As a pre-processing step, any edges
within the network that were identified as containing significant polling behavior ac-
cording to the g-statistic procedure of [3] were removed from the data. This level of
filtering could lead to potentially important user-driven authentication behavior also be-
ing deleted. The proposed methodology seeks to separate the user-driven events from the
automated polling events on a given network edge, rather than completely removing the
edge.
3.1 Detecting Polling Subsequences
This section presents a simulation study to demonstrate the performance of the Fourier
analysis presented in Section 3 for detecting polling behavior contained within peri-
odic subsequences. This study provides justification for using a changepoint detection
methodology to detect periodic subsequences. To construct a full generative model for
an ordered sequence of event times with intermittent periodicity, we first consider two
sequences
x1,x2, . . . ,xS
i.i.d.∼ Exponential(λ),
n1,n2, . . . ,nS
i.i.d.∼ Geometric(q),
(2)
such that xi specifies the duration of inactivity before the ith polling subsequence com-
mences, ni specifies the number of beaconing periods of length P within that ith subse-
quence and S is the number of polling subsequence within the event sequence.
In each simulation a sequence is sampled from the model (2) for different values of
q and S. The constant periodicity is fixed at P = 1 and λ is chosen to be 0.2. The value
for λ generates large durations of inactivity which break the polling cycle. The event
times in the beaconing subsequences are perturbed with U(−0.2,0.2) errors; more realistic
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representations of this error are provided in Section 4.
The case where q = 1 corresponds to no periodic behavior, and the approximate p-
values from the upper tail of the test statistic (1) will be approximately uniformly dis-
tributed on [0,1]. As q decreases, the proportion of periodic data increases and the test
should yield statistically smaller p-values. For q < 1, increasing the total number of sub-
sequences S increases the overall sample size, and should also yield statistically smaller
p-values.
Ten thousand Monte Carlo simulations were performed for different combinations of
q ∈ {1,0.5,0.25,0.1}, S ∈ {20,40}. Figures 2 and 3 show the empirical cumulative distribu-
tion function of the resulting p-values for all combinations of q and S.
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Figure 2: Distribution of p-values from g-test of simple periodicity for 20 polling subse-
quences generated from (2) with parameters λ = 0.2 and q ∈ {1,0.5,0.25,0.1}. It is clear
that a decrease in q yields statistically smaller p-values for periodicity in the event se-
quence.
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Figure 3: Distribution of p-values from g-test of simple periodicity for 40 polling subse-
quences generated from (2) with parameters λ = 0.2 and q ∈ {1,0.5,0.25,0.1}. By compar-
ing the results with Figure 2 it is clear that increasing the number of polling subsequences
yields statistically smaller p-values for q ∈ {0.5,0.25,0.1}.
When q = 1, the p-values are approximately uniformly distributed. Even when q = 0.5,
which in expectation provides the shortest meaningful subsequence length for exhibiting
a common periodicity, the distribution of p-values is already quite different. For a mod-
erate expected subsequence length of 10, q = 0.1, the p-values from observing 20 such
subsequences are concentrated strongly at zero. These simulations imply that the ran-
dom lengths of inactivity in-between periodic subsequences do not significantly reduce
the signal of the Fourier transform-based g-test. Polling behavior is still detectable even
in the most extreme cases. By comparing Figures 2 and 3, it is clear that increasing the
number of polling subsequences causes a further decrease in the p-values.
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This section uses a crude uniform estimate to model the random error of each event in
a periodic subsequence. Section 4 introduces directional statistics and explains how they
can be used to provide a smoother more accurate estimate of this error.
4 Directional Statistics
For modeling data with an underlying periodicity, it is intuitively most simple to consider
noise in the data as angular displacements from the underlying periodic sequence. For
a given period P , event times from a point process can be transformed to directions in
two-dimensional space, represented by points on a unit circle. For an event time y, let
φ(y) =
2piy
P
(mod 2pi),
denote the angular position of the corresponding point on the unit circle. Under this
transformation, any variability in the periodic event times corresponds to small angular
displacements from an overall angular mean. This transformation is depicted in Figure
4.
The mean direction and circular variance provide respective measures of the location
and spread of directional data: For a given sample φ = (φ1, . . . ,φn), let xi = (xi,1,xi,2)
where xi,1 = cosφi and xi,2 = sinφi , such that xi is the location of a unit vector with angle
φi in two-dimensional space. Then let x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) denote the mean resultant vector of
the sample, where x¯1 =
∑n
i=1xi,1/n and x¯2 =
∑n
i=1xi,2/n, and let R¯ =
√
x¯21 + x¯
2
2 denote the
length of x¯. The mean direction φ¯ is defined to be
φ¯ = arctan(x¯2/x¯1) (mod 2pi),
and the circular variance is defined as V = 1− R¯. A comprehensive overview of these and
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Figure 4: Cartoon depiction of the transformation y 7→ φ(y) reducing event times on R+
to angular positions with respect to a unit periodicity.
other directional data summaries is provided in [9].
4.1 The von Mises Distribution
A commonly used distribution for directional data is the von Mises distribution [10]. A
random variable θ is said to follow the von Mises distribution with location parameter
ν ∈ [0,2pi) and precision parameter κ > 0, written M(ν,κ), if it has density
fM(θ | ν,κ) = exp(κcos(θ − ν))2piI0(κ) , θ ∈ [0,2pi),
where I`(·) is the modified Bessel function of order `. In Section 5 the von Mises distribu-
tion will be used to construct a model for periodic event subsequences, and so it is useful
to review frequentist and Bayesian parameter estimation for this distribution.
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4.1.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Let θ1, . . . ,θn be a sequence of realizations drawn from M(ν,κ). The log-likelihood func-
tion for this sample simplifies to
l(ν,κ | θ1, . . . ,θn) = n{log2pi+κR¯cos(θ¯ − ν)− log I0(κ)}, (3)
[9]. Maximizing with respect to the location parameter ν yields the maximum likelihood
estimate (MLE)
νˆ = θ¯, (4)
where θ¯ is the mean direction of the sample, defined above. Substituting θ¯ into (3) and
differentiating with respect to κ yields the equation
κˆ = A−1(R¯) (5)
for the MLE for κ, where
A(κ) =
I1(κ)
I0(κ)
.
There is no analytic solution for (5), but numerical estimates can be obtained [11, 9].
4.1.2 Bayesian Inference
For relatively straightforward Bayesian inference for the von Mises distribution, [12] and
[13] use the conjugate prior
g(ν,κ) ∝ {I0(κ)}−c exp(κR0 cos(ν − ν0)) . (6)
This specification is analogous to having observed c notional prior directional samples
with a mean direction ν0 and resultant length R0.
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As in the previous section, let θ1, . . . ,θn be samples drawn from M(ν,κ). Then the
posterior distribution is given by
g(ν,κ | θ1, . . . ,θn) ∝ {I0(κ)}−(c+n) exp(κRn cos(ν − νn)) , (7)
where νn is the mean direction of the resultant of the sum of a vector with direction ν0
and length R0 together with unit vectors in each of the directions of the samples θ1, . . . ,θn,
and Rn is the magnitude of that resultant vector. The Metropolis Hastings algorithm can
be used to obtain a posterior estimate for the precision parameter κ.
5 A Model for Periodic Subsequences
To construct a full generative model for an ordered sequence of event times with inter-
mittent periodicity, we first consider the two sequences defined in (2) on page 6, where xi
specifies the duration of inactivity before the ith polling subsequence commences and ni
specifies the number of beaconing periods of length P within that ith subsequence.
Within a polling subsequence, 0 events (in the case of missing data), 1 event, or mul-
tiple events (in the case of duplication) may be observed during each period. Within the
ith polling subsequence, for j = 1, . . . ,ni let mi,j be the number of events observed in the
jth period. The values of each event countmi,j is assumed to be hurdle geometric: Defining
δi,j = 1(mi,j > 0)
we assume δi,j ∼ Bernoulli(1− p); if δi,j = 0 then clearly mi,j = 0, and otherwise if δi,j = 1
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then (mi,j − 1) ∼Geometric(r) for parameters 0 < p,r < 1, implying
P(mi,j =m) =

p, m = 0,
(1− p)(1− r)rm−1, m ≥ 1.
5.1 Fixed Phase Polling
Figure 5 shows an example of a possible subsequence of event data exhibiting fixed phase
polling, where an error in one event does not propagate into future events. A cross indi-
cates an observed event whilst a square indicates a period with missing data.
P P P P P
y1 y2 y3 y4 y7. . .
y′1,1,1 y′1,1,2 y′1,2,1 y′1,3,1 y′1,5,1. . .
Figure 5: Example of a subsequence of periodic event times exhibiting fixed phase polling
with period P .
To construct a subsequence exhibiting fixed phase polling. For the ith polling subse-
quence and the jth period of the ith subsequence, i = 1,2, . . . and j = 1, . . . ,ni , let θi,j,1 <
. . . < θi,j,mi,j be the order statistics frommi,j independent draws from the von Mises distri-
bution M(pi,κ). Then for k = 1 . . . ,mi,j we define the ordered event times for that period
to be
y′i,j,k =
i−1∑
i′=1
(xi′ +ni′P ) + xi + P
{
(j − 1) + θi,j,k
2pi
}
.
Considering these event times transformed to the unit circle, let
φi,j,k =
2pi · y′i,j,k
P
(mod 2pi), (8)
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be the corresponding angular representation. Since θi,j,k has expected value pi, it can
easily be seen that the expected angular position of each event time in the ith periodic
subsequence is given by
νi = E(φi,j,k) =
2pi∑ii′=1xi′P +pi
 (mod 2pi). (9)
Therefore the angular displacement error associated with each event time is described by
the M(0,κ) distributed variables
zi,j,k = (φi,j,k − νi) (mod 2pi)
= (θi,j,k +pi) (mod 2pi).
Finally, to complete the specification for a point process of event times with periodic
subsequences, let y1 < y2 < . . . be the sequence of observable event times defined by
yσ (i,j,k) = y
′
i,j,k ,
σ (i, j,k) =
i−1∑
i′=1
ni′∑
j ′=1
mi′ ,j ′ +
j−1∑
j ′=1
mi,j ′ + k. (10)
An illustration of this indexing format is provided in Figure 5.
5.2 Fixed Duration Polling
An example of a possible subsequence exhibiting fixed duration polling is shown in Fig-
ure 6. It is most intuitive to define the event times recursively, since the event times in one
period affect the mean of the distribution of event times for subsequent periods. To con-
struct a subsequence of event times exhibiting fixed duration polling, let z′i,j,k ∈ (−pi,pi] be
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y1,1,1 y1,1,2 y1,2,1 y1,3,1 y1,5,1. . .
Figure 6: Example of a subsequence of periodic event times exhibiting fixed duration
polling with period P .
the angular displacement error associated with each event time, drawn from M(0,κ). Let
y¯i,j =

x1 mi,j = 0, i = 1, j = 1,
y¯i−1,ni−1 + xi mi,j = 0, i > 1, j = 1,
y¯i,ni−1 + P mi,j = 0, j > 1,∑mi,j
k=1 y
′
i,j,k/mi,j mi,j > 0,
such that for each non-empty period in a beaconing subsequence y¯i,j is the arithmetic
mean of all event times in that period. Then we define the ordered event times for each
period to be
y′i,j,k =

x1 + z′1,1,k i = 1, j = 1,
y¯i−1,ni−1 + xi + z
′
i,1,k i > 1, j = 1,
y¯i,j−1 + P + z′i,j,k j > 1.
The sequence of observable event times is again described by (10).
6 Changepoint Detection
Changepoint detection techniques are widely used in data analysis across a range of scien-
tific fields. These methods partition a sequence of data into a possibly unknown number
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of smaller segments, such that the data within each segment are assumed to arise from a
single generative model. Here, discrete changepoint analysis are used to separate a point
process of event times on a computer network edge into periodic subsequences, using one
of the proposed models from Section 5.
Let y1 < . . . < yn be a sequence of event times from a point process. Suppose the se-
quence is partitioned intom+1 segments bym integer-valued changepoints τ¯ = (τ1, . . . , τm),
ordered such that 0 ≡ τ0 < τ1 < . . . < τm < τm+1 ≡ n. For each i = 1, . . . ,m+1, the ith segment
of data is the subsequence of event times yτi−1+1:τi = (yτi−1+1, . . . , yτi ).
A common aim of discrete changepoint detection algorithms is to find changepoints
that minimize an overall cost function
m+1∑
i=1
[C(yτi−1+1:τi )] + βn, (11)
where C is a segment-based cost function relating to the fitted likelihood of the data in a
segment and βn ∈R is a penalty term to discourage over fitting.
There are many changepoint detection algorithms, but here we consider binary seg-
mentation (BS), optimal partitioning (OP) and the pruned exact linear time (PELT) algo-
rithm [14]. [15] introduces the BS method for changepoint detection. This method has
the advantage of being computationally efficient, O(n logn), but it is not guaranteed to
find the global minimum of (11). [16] introduces the OP method which is guaranteed
to minimize (11). The OP method works by iterating sequentially through each event
time and minimizing (11) conditional on all previous combinations of changepoints. The
disadvantage to this method is that it has computational cost which is quadratic in n.
[14] introduces the PELT method which uses pruning to improve the computational
efficiency of the OP method whilst still ensuring that the search algorithm finds a global
minimum to (11). Under the assumption that the number of changepoints m increases
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linearly with the size of the data n, PELT has a linear computational cost. Pseudo code
for both the PELT and the OP methods can be found in [14].
Following the changepoint literature [17], C is chosen to be twice the negative log-
likelihood function for a periodic subsequence of data according to a model from Section
5. Furthermore, in accordance with the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) [18], the
penalty is chosen to be of the form
βn = α logn, (12)
where α notionally represents the number of additional free parameters introduced to
the model by adding a changepoint. Here the natural choice is α = 2, since the only pa-
rameters introduced by adding a changepoint are the position of the changepoint within
the data sequence and the location parameter (9) of the new periodic subsequence.
Using the various definitions from Section 5, the likelihood of a proposed subsequence
is given by
λe−λxi (1− q)ni−1q
ni∏
j=1
(1− δi,j)p+ δi,j(1− p)(1− r)rmi,j−1 mi,j∏
k=1
exp{κcos(φi,j,k − νˆi,j)}
2piI0(κ)
 ,
where in the case of fixed phase polling νˆi,j = νˆi is the MLE (4) for the location parameter
of the von Mises distribution using the angular representation (8) of all event times from
the proposed subsequence. In the case of fixed duration polling νˆi,j is the MLE (4) for the
location parameter of the von Mises distribution using the angular representation (8) of
all event times from the previous non-empty period.
When the parameters (p,q, r,λ,κ) are considered unknown, independent conjugate
priors can be deployed such that p, q and r have beta distributions with respective pa-
rameters (αp,βp), (αq,βq), and (αr ,βr), whilst λ ∼ gamma(αλ,βλ). The prior distribution
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for κ is given by (6). A simple Metropolis Hastings algorithm with a uniform proposal
density centered at the current parameter value can be used to obtain a posterior estimate
of κ, (7) using the estimated angular displacements of the event times,
zˆi,j,k = (φi,j,k − νˆi,j) (mod 2pi),
where it is assumed that zˆi,j,k ∼M(0,κ).
The proposed procedure is to iterate between three inferential steps:
1. Changepoint analysis for identifying periodic subsequence using PELT
2. Bayesian estimation of the nuisance parameters (p,q, r,λ,κ)
3. Updating the estimated periodicity P
The algorithm simply loops through steps 1-3 repeatedly until convergence is reached:
Convergence is determined to have occurred when identical changepoints are found by
step 1 in two successive iterations of the algorithm. After each iteration of the change-
point algorithm in step 1, the nuisance parameters are re-estimated using their revised
posterior means, conditional on the updated set of changepoints, in step 2. The poste-
rior means of the parameters p,q, r,λ all have closed form under the conjugate priors,
and the posterior mean of κ is estimated by Metropolis Hastings sampling as described
above. Finally, the estimated periodicity P is also updated in step 3 as follows: For each
non-empty period in a beaconing subsequence, let y¯i,j be the arithmetic mean of all event
times in that period; then for j = 1, . . . ,ni −1 let wi,j = y¯i,j+1− y¯i,j be the difference between
the mean event times from two successive periods of events. To reduce the influence of
missing event data, P is estimated to be the median value of {wi,j} over all subsequences i
defined by the current set of changepoints.
Since computational scalability is paramount, changepoints are detected using PELT,
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which has a computational cost which is linear in the number of data points. For updating
model parameters between successive iterations of the PELT algorithm, maximum like-
lihood estimation can potentially lead to degenerate solutions and therefore a Bayesian
estimation procedure is adopted.
7 Examples
7.1 Simulated Data Example
To gain an understanding of the accuracy and the efficiency of two of the changepoint de-
tection algorithms, both the BS and PELT methods described in Section 6 are applied to
sequences of events times sampled from the full generative model for fixed phase polling
from Section 5. The aim is to partition the event times so that each changepoint is posi-
tioned at the start of a new periodic subsequence, therefore changepoints can only occur
at the discrete number of event times within the data.
Three different combinations of the model parameters p,q, r,λ and κ are used to gen-
erate different types of periodic subsequences which could arise in real world computer
network data. For example, larger values of κ induce smaller error terms in the angular
displacements of the beaconing subsequences, whilst increasing λ leads to longer lengths
of inactivity between the subsequences. Both of these changes should make separate peri-
odic subsequences easier to identify. Without loss of generality, the periodicity is set to 1.
The three sets of parameter choices are presented in Table 1. For each set of parameters,
100 sequences of 10 beaconing subsequences were generated.
Both the BS and the PELT algorithms identify changepoints by minimizing (11). In
this example, the proportion of true positive(TP) changepoints corresponds to the num-
ber of true changepoints correctly identified divided by the total number of true change-
points, whilst the proportion of false positive(FP) changepoints corresponds to the num-
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Parameter settings κ p r q λ
1 9 10 0.05 0.5 0.1
2 8 10 0.1 0.5 0.1
3 7 10 0.2 0.5 0.1
Table 1: Parameter settings for generating periodic subsequences of event times from the
generative model for fixed phase polling in Section 5.
ber of events incorrectly identified as changepoints, divided by the true number of events
which do not correspond to a changepoint.
Figure 7 plots an example of one sequence of simulated event times comprised of
ten beaconing subsequences with periodicity 1, generated with parameter setting 2 from
Table 1. Changepoints were detected using PELT with the commonly used BIC penalty
βn = 2log(n) (12). For each event time yσ (i,j,k) from (10), the angular position φi,j,k from
(8), determined by the fitted changepoints, is plotted. The vertical lines indicate the loca-
tions of the changepoints, which correctly partition the event times into the ten separate
subsequences.
To obtain a thorough comparison of the two methods, the performance of both meth-
ods was tested over a range of settings for the penalty βn from (12) by repeating the anal-
ysis for α ∈ {−3,−1.5,0,2,5,10,20,40}. Increasing α corresponds to a higher penalty βn for
adding a changepoint, therefore we would expect to detect fewer TP and FP changepoints
as α increases.
Note that for completeness even negative penalties are considered, in order to reach
the extreme case where every event time is selected to be a changepoint. This enables
a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve to be plotted in Figure 8, showing how
the true and false positive changepoint rates increase as the penalty term is reduced. If
α was increased further, we would eventually reach the other extreme where no event
times are selected as changepoints. Since PELT only has linear computational cost when
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Figure 7: A simulated point process representing periodic subsequences, partitioned by
changepoints found using PELT.
the number of changepoints increases linearly with the size of the data, [14] reducing the
number of changepoints towards zero is computationally prohibitive and is therefore not
included.
The proportions of true and false positive changepoints found using PELT closely
resemble those found using the BS method. Table 2 presents the proportion of TP and FP
changepoints found for the commonly used BIC penalty, βn = 2log(n). In this case PELT
identifies at least as high a proportion of TP changepoints as the BS method, and at least
as small a proportion of FP changepoints for all three parameter settings.
Parameter settings
BS PELT
TP FP TP FP
1 0.9587 0.0002 0.9587 0.0002
2 0.8784 0.0007 0.8845 0.0006
3 0.6340 0.0012 0.6639 0.0010
Table 2: Proportion of true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) changepoints identified
under the BIC penalty.
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Figure 8: ROC curves comparing the changepoints detected using PELT and BS for data
generated using the three parameter settings in Table 1.
To further investigate how the two methods differ, the run time of the two algorithms
is measured against the number of changepoints for the commonly used BIC penalty.
For each set of parameters from Table 1, ten sequences formed of different numbers of
beaconing subsequences (equivalently, changepoints) were generated. The average run
time in seconds on a computer with an Intel Core i7 processor, clocked at 2.2 GHz, are
presented in Table 3. Both algorithms use the same underlying code for calculating the
cost of a proposed changepoint configuration. In almost all situations, the PELT method
was quicker than the BS method, especially when the number of changepoints in the
model increased.
Changepoint algorithm BS PELT
Parameter setting 1 2 3 1 2 3
Number of changepoints
10 14.1 8.7 8.2 12.1 6.2 9.3
20 46.8 36.4 29.0 28.3 19.9 20.4
50 293.0 219.4 171.3 57.7 45.0 63.4
100 1110.1 995.9 824.7 102.9 99.7 200.4
Table 3: Average run times (in seconds) using the two changepoint detection algorithms
for different numbers of changepoints and parameter settings from Table 1.
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When monitoring real computer networks, traffic is often observed for several days to
allow construction of an accurate model of normal behavior. It is therefore possible that a
large number of beaconing periodic subsequences could be observed; in such cases, where
there is an unknown but potentially large number of changepoints, the PELT method is
preferable since it has a linear computational cost.
7.2 Real Data Example
The PELT changepoint detection algorithm for detecting periodic subsequences, pre-
sented in Section 6, is applied to the authentication data from the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) computer network described in Section 2. The analysis in this section
focuses on the “Log On” events for user U514 depicted in Figure 1. The event times for
each source-destination pair of computers are modeled as separate point processes. The
time of day distribution of all Log On events from user U514 are shown in Figure 1, where
the lack of variation in the number of events within and outside the working day indi-
cated the presence of substantial polling behavior associated with this username. The
periodicity detection method was applied separately to each computer-computer point
process, identifying the first event after each changepoint as a user-driven Log On event.
Unlike the previous example these data exhibit fixed duration polling, where any error
in the beaconing subsequence propagates into future event times (see Section 5).
To initialize the algorithm, the model parameters (p,q, r,λ,κ) are initially estimated
using the means of the prior distributions given in Section 6. The hyper-parameters of
the prior distributions are estimated empirically from a small segment of a beaconing
subsequence, in one point process in the network. These hyper-parameters are given in
Table 4.
As in Figure 1, the left panel of Figure 9 plots all event times over the entire 58-day
period, where user U514 logs onto computer C528 from computer C15607. The circles
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Parameter settings R c αp βp αr βr αq βq αλ βλ
1 9 10 10 1 10 5 10 1 20 1
Table 4: Parameter settings for generating periodic subsequences of event times from the
generative model in Section 5.
in the diagram now indicate the inferred user-driven events that initiate the start of an
automated polling subsequence. It is clear that meaningful subsequences of periodic
event times are identified, and the methodology is robust to duplicate event data, as seen
between days 5 and 10, and missing event data, as seen between days 35 and 40.
The right panel of Figure 9 plots the distribution of the 169 human Log On events
found by applying the PELT changepoint detection algorithm to all pairs of computers
used by user U514 over the entire 58-day period. The distribution of these events is
much more consistent with human behavior than Figure 1, with the majority of events
occurring within the hours of an extended working day (9am-8pm) and a large spike of
Log On events at the start of the working day (9am-10am).
For user U514, automated polling behavior accounts for over 97% of all Log On data.
As a data reduction tool, this represents a significant thinning of the bulk of authentica-
tion data. Further analytics operating on only user-driven behavior would become more
manageable and allow for more robust modeling, potentially strengthening anomaly de-
tection capabilities.
7.2.1 Robustness
The proposed procedure of iterating between the changepoint analysis and Bayesian es-
timation of the nuisance parameters introduces random variation to the algorithm due to
the stochastic nature of the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. Variation can also be
introduced by varying the specification of the prior hyper-parameters displayed in Table
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Figure 9: Log on event times for U514 from the LANL computer network. Left: Log on
event times between the two specific computers C528 and C15607, where events have
been attributed as human or automated, periodic events. Right: The time of day distri-
bution for all human-generated events attributed to the user.
4. We examine the robustness of the model by performing 10 repetitions of the algorithm
on the same data set, for each of three different sets of prior hyper-parameters. These
hyper-parameters are presented in Table 5.
Parameter settings R c αp βp αr βr αq βq αλ βλ
1 8 10 10 2 10 5 10 1 10 1
2 9 10 10 1 10 5 10 1 20 1
3 7 10 10 3 10 5 10 1 5 1
Table 5: Parameter settings for generating periodic subsequences of event times from the
generative model in Section 5.
To measure the effect of the random variation introduced by the MH algorithm for ap-
proximating Bayesian estimation of the posterior parameters, let e1, . . . , eM be the ordered
list of all events in the data sequence. Then let bi,l,1, . . . , bi,l,M be a binary representation
of the changepoint events found by the ith repetition of the algorithm, with prior hyper-
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parameters l ∈ {1,2,3}. When the algorithm identifies ek to be a changepoint (user driven
event), bi,l,k = 1. Otherwise ek is assumed to be automated and bi,l,k = 0. For prior hyper-
parameter settings l ∈ {1,2,3} and each pair of repetitions of the algorithm i, j ∈ {1 . . .10},
i , j, let
ci,j,l =
∑M
k=1 | bi,l,k − bj,l,k |
M
be the proportion of events which are assigned differently. ci,j,l is calculated for all pairs
of repetitions of the algorithm under each choice of hyper-parameters. Finally let cl be
the mean of ci,j,l over all pairs of repetitions, i, j ∈ 1 . . .10, i , j.
For the first set of hyper-parameters, we find that c1 = 0.000103. This value im-
plies that any two repetitions of the algorithm make identical inference except for ap-
proximately 1 in every 1000 events differently. We also found that c2 = 0.000177 and
c3 = 0.000103.
We are also interested in finding the effects of changing the prior hyper-parameterisation
of the model. For each prior hyper-parameterisation displayed in Table 5 and event ek, let
b¯l,k =
∑10
i=1 bi,l,k
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be the proportion of repetitions of the algorithm which identify the kth event to be user-
driven. Then, for l1, l2 ∈ {1,2,3}, let
dl1,l2 =
∑M
k=1 | b¯l1,k − b¯l2,k |
M
be the average proportion of events which are differently categorized for prior hyper-
parameterisations l1 and l2.
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For the 2 alternative sets of hyper-parameters proposed in Table 4 we find that
d1,2 = 0.000332, d1,3 = 0.000442.
Compared to the results found for the original parameter settings, approximately three
in every 1000 events are assigned differently when using prior hyper-parameter settings
2, and approximately four in every 1000 events are assigned differently when using prior
hyper-parameter settings 3.
The example presented in the left panel of Figure 9 identified the inferred user-driven
Log-On events when U514 logs onto computer C528 from computer C15607. In this
example, the algorithm finds the same inferred user-driven Log-On events for all repe-
titions of the algorithm, for all prior hyper-parameterisations. The right panel of Figure
9 plots the distribution of the 169 human Log On events found by applying the algo-
rithm to all pairs of computers used by user U514 over the entire 58-day period. This
plot is visually indistinguishable for all repetitions of the algorithm, for all prior hyper-
parameterisations.
The results in this section show that any variability in the algorithm, due to the
stochastic variability of the MH algorithm or from altering the specification of the prior
hyper-parameters, has a very small effect on the resulting inference.
8 Conclusion
In this article we first demonstrated that intermittent polling behavior in computer net-
work data can typically be detected using standard Fourier analysis methods, such as
[3]. Secondly, we proposed a methodology for identifying the separate beaconing sub-
sequences within intermittent polling data. Conditional on the presence of intermittent
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polling behavior, with a constant periodicity estimated by [3], we introduced a change-
point detection methodology to identify the separate polling subsequences within the
overall event sequence. We proposed iterating between the changepoint analysis and es-
timation of nuisance parameters, to reflect the dependency between the these quantities.
The proposed method is robust to complications typically encountered in computer event
data collection, such as duplicated and missing data.
The purpose of partitioning event data into periodic subsequences is to identify po-
tentially user-driven actions in computer network event data, with the future intention
of modeling user-driven and automated behavior separately for anomaly detection pur-
poses. User-driven actions are identified as the first events of each beaconing subse-
quence, which are followed by automated periodic updates.
Treating automated and user-driven data separately should provide a more robust
framework for modeling computer network data, whereby bespoke models can be speci-
fied for each type of behavior (see for example [2]). Alternatively, as a data reduction tool,
identifying only user-driven events represents a significant thinning of the bulk of com-
puter network data, potentially improving anomaly detection capability and efficiency.
In this article the changepoint detection methodology was applied separately to each
edge in a computer network, with the aim of classifying human user activity against au-
tomated events. If the events from an edge in the network consist of a single beaconing
sequence with no phase shifts, this suggests no human activity and the event data will be
best described using the simpler method of [3]. However, if the events consist of multiple,
intermittent periodic subsequences sharing a constant periodicity, the methodology pro-
posed in this article can be used to identify the user-driven events initiating each period
subsequence. If the events exhibit no periodic patterns, then we might conclude that the
events from that edge are potentially all user-driven.
The algorithm was applied to authentication data from the Los Alamos National Lab-
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oratory (LANL) enterprise computer network. The algorithm identified meaningful sub-
sequences of periodic event times and was robust to duplicate and missing event data.
In the absence of true classification labels for the data, we investigated the time of day
distributions of the inferred user-driven events and compared this with the distribution
for all of the authentication events from one user. The distribution of the inferred user-
driven events was much more consistent with human behavior, displaying a more clear
diurnal pattern.
Further extensions of the model could be considered. For example, within the ith
subsequence, θijk are assumed to be the order statistics of independent identically dis-
tributed draws from a M(pi,κ) distribution. However, in reality there is often a correla-
tion exhibited between these angular displacements within a beaconing period, as events
can arrive in bursts. To incorporate this correlation into the model, we could postulate
a hierarchical model for beaconing subsequences of event times, where clusters of event
time variables θijk are considered to be only conditionally independent given some un-
observed location value.
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